Some individuals devalue positivity previously associated with negativity (Winer & Salem, 2016). Positive emotions (e.g. happiness) may be seen as threatening and result in active avoidance of futu...

Some Christian theologians and philosophers maintain that God’s punishments are always (at least partly) motivated by redemptive love for those punished, even when these punishments are considerably severe (e.g., killings or damnations). However, advocates of such a conception of divine punishment face significant challenges. Perhaps most fundamentally, it is not entirely apparent how severe and loving features of divine punishment might be understood to fit together within a viable theological model. In this article this foundational issue is addressed. By culling (...) resources from St. Gregory of Nyssa, the present aim is to proffer a contemporary model of divine punishment that naturally combines redemptive love for those punished with apparently harsh treatment. (shrink)

Textbook Islam, nation building, and the question of violence / Gregory Starrett and Eleanor Abdella Doumato -- Egypt : promoting tolerance, defending against Islamism / James A. Toronto and Muhammad S. Eissa -- Iran : a Shi'ite curriculum to serve the Islamic state / Golnar Mehran -- Jordan : prescription for obedience and conformity / Betty Anderson -- Kuwait : striving to align Islam with Western values / Taghreed Alqudsi-Ghabra -- Oman : cultivating good citizens and religious virtue (...) / Mandana E. Limbert -- The Palestinian national authority : the politics of writing and interpreting curricula. Genesis of a new curriculum / Nathan Brown ; A conflict of historical narratives / Seif Da'Na -- Saudi Arabia : from "Wahhabi" roots to contemporary revisionism / Eleanor Abdella Doumato -- Syria : secularism, Arabism, and Sunni orthodoxy / Joshua Landis -- Turkey : sanctifying a secular state / Ozlem Altan -- Textbook meanings and the power of interpretation / Gregory Starrett -- Conclusion : tailor-made Islam / Eleanor Abdella Doumato and Gregory Starrett. (shrink)

In The Ethics of Food, Gregory E. Pence brings together a collection of voices who share the view that the ethics of genetically modified food is among the most pressing societal questions of our time. This comprehensive collection addresses a broad range of subjects, including the meaning of food, moral analyses of vegetarianism and starvation, the safety and environmental risks of genetically modified food, issues of global food politics and the food industry, and the relationships among food, evolution, and (...) human history. (shrink)

This essay contends that God created humanity as His co-creators to bring Him glory with one’s entire being, including imagination and creativity. Throughout Scripture, YHWH is depicted as the artistic Creator of all that is beautiful, true, and transcendent. The Bible attests the creation of humanity in the imago Dei--sharing God’s innate creativity--and divine gifting of Spirit-inspired artisans utilizing their talents for God’s glory. Yet, over the centuries, “art” was oft misunderstood and grossly neglected in Christ’s church. Philip Ryken explains (...) how medieval skeptics began removing and destroying art believed to violate the Decalogue. Imbalanced suspicions toward art in Christendom still persist, despite the positive, inspirational effects of icons in Catholic and Orthodox traditions and scientific research that shows the therapeutic value of art across a broad spectrum of mental and physical challenges, including isolation and depression. Makoto Fujimura posits that Christian creatives possess a common faith as “border-walkers,” and can affect phoenix-like positive cultural and ecclesial change by reintroducing beauty as a visible “sermon” into a fragmented, post-pandemic world. (shrink)

I once heard John Arras, who was one of bioethics’ bright lights and, toward the end of his life, a member of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, remark that it is hard for an ethics commission not to “do paint‐by‐numbers ethics.” What I think Arras had in mind is an approach that, in the set of essays that make up this special report, Rebecca Dresser describes as a listing of “general, often relatively uncontroversial” moral positions to (...) support largely procedural recommendations. Arras was calling attention to one of the challenges and sometimes frustrations of commission thinking. It is a recurring topic in this special report, Goals and Practices of Public Bioethics, which features a series of reflections about how national bioethics commissions around the world have contributed to public understanding and public policy about bioethical issues. Both the topic and the authors are drawn from the final two public meetings of the PCSBI, which was the most recent U.S. example of a national bioethics commission and whose winding down created an occasion for pondering the different forms and functions of bioethics commissions. (shrink)

I recently wrote to a friend and occasional Report contributor that part of the job of editor, as I understand it, is to recognize the merit in and, in effect, foster the advancement of work that one actually believes is in some sense wrongheaded. It's a point I want on the table as I introduce the two articles in this issue of the Report—not because I necessarily think these articles are wrongheaded, but because I want it clear that publishing the (...) articles does not necessarily mean I or others at the Center think they are right, either. We publish articles that we think advance thinking, but that can mean publishing articles that challenge morally compelling positions. Thus, deciding whether one agrees with a .. (shrink)

Two disputes are waged simultaneously in the pages of this issue of the Report, but it might be easy to lose track of the second. The obvious dispute is about resource allocation in health policy: the question is whether limited health care resources should be spent on identified victims—people whose struggles with disease have made the news—when the same investment might provide more help if spent on a larger number of unknown, merely “statistical” people. The second, less easily noticed dispute (...) is about the challenge of crafting public policy when the arguments pro and con are not decisive. (shrink)

Should there be limits to the human alteration of the natural world? Through a study of debates about the environment, agricultural biotechnology, synthetic biology, and human enhancement, Gregory E. Kaebnick argues that such moral concerns about nature can be legitimate but are also complex, contestable, and politically limited.

This issue of the Hastings Center Report coincides with the annual conference of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, whose theme this year is “Where do we stand?” The issue addresses that theme with the article by Debra Mathews and colleagues and the set of brief response essays that follow it. Mathews et al., drawing on work carried out by the Association of Bioethics Program Directors, pose questions about how to understand and evaluate the worth of bioethics research. Those (...) questions require them to think very broadly about what bioethics is, in the first place, and how it is related to medicine, health policy, science, and society generally. In short, they are thinking at the highest level about the question, where do we stand? (shrink)

Much work in bioethics tries to sidestep bedrock questions about moral values. This is fine if we agree on our values; arguments about human enhancement suggest we do not. One bedrock question underlying these arguments concerns the role of emotion in morality: worries about enhancement are derided as emotional and thus irrational. In fact, both emotion and reason are integral to all moral judgment.

In this important new book Gregory E. Pence looks at issues on the frontiers of medicine including gene therapy to produce 'brave new babies,' cloning, human eggs and embryos for sale, and experiments on human embryos. Pence argues that the conservatism of the medical establishment, the bioethics community, and the public at large has created shibboleths that impede improvements in our quality of life.

In a recent issue of this journal, Kevin Corcoran has argued that the metaphysical theory one holds to about the nature of human persons is irrelevant to the sort of ethical questions that occupy bioethicists as well as the general public. Specifically, he argues that whether one holds a constitution view of human persons, an animalist view, or a substance dualist view, the real work in one’s ethical reasoning is done by certain moral principles rather than by metaphysical ones. I (...) raise objections to his analysis and propose that it is a combination of ethical principles and metaphysical principles that does the work in our judgements about the morality of abortion and other actions. (shrink)

Much work in bioethics tries to sidestep bedrock questions about moral values. This is fine if we agree on our values; arguments about human enhancement suggest we do not. One bedrock question underlying these arguments concerns the role of emotion in morality: worries about enhancement are derided as emotional and thus irrational. In fact, both emotion and reason are integral to all moral judgment.

How strong is the argument for requiring public deliberation by very large publics—at national or even global levels—before moving forward with efforts to use gene editing on wild populations of plants or animals? Should there be a general moratorium on any such efforts until such broad public deliberation has been successfully carried out? This article works toward recommendations about the need for and general framing of broad public deliberation. It finds that broad public deliberation is highly desirable but not flatly (...) necessary before moving forward with any local cases of gene editing in the wild. It also finds that broad public deliberation would be most helpful in generating very general guidance and is unlikely to be appropriate for specific cases. Broad public deliberation is most helpful for cases that involve higher levels of uncertainty and moral ambiguity, but separating out a distinct class of cases for deliberation is not yet possible. (shrink)

The March–April issue of the Hastings Center Report offers another in a series of articles over the last few years on the structure and the ethics of surrogate decision‐making. Here, Daniel Brudney addresses how to help the surrogate deal with a treatment decision. A core insight he offers is that the structure of the surrogate’s decision has been misunderstood and the misunderstanding makes the task yet harder. As usually understood, the surrogate is supposed to be guided by the question, what (...) would the patient choose, if the patient were making the choice herself? Brudney argues that this conception is impossible, and that the surrogate’s task is instead to consider the patient’s best interests, as illuminated in part by the patient’s expressed values and past choices. This understanding leads, he argues, to a different guiding question: what could the patient choose, given her values? (shrink)

The Affordable Care Act survived the Supreme Court—but “just barely”—according to Mark Hall, a contributor to the Report's At Law column. That “just barely” leaves much to ponder, and in this issue a special installment of At Law, appearing as a set of essays, looks into it.

Concerns about the sacred—common in everyday moral thinking—have crept into bioethics in various forms. Further, given a certain view of the metaphysics of morals that is now widely endorsed in Western philosophy, there is in principle no reason that judgments about the sacred cannot be part of careful and reasoned moral deliberation.

A majority opinion seems to have emerged in scholarly analysis of the assortment of technologies that have been given the label “synthetic biology.” According to this view, society should allow the technology to proceed and even provide it some financial support, while monitor­ing its progress and attempting to ensure that the development leads to good outcomes. The near‐consensus is captured by the U.S. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues in its report New Directions: The Ethics of Synthetic Biology (...) and Emerging Technologies, which arguably marked the end of a preliminary round of analysis about the ethical and policy questions raised by synthetic bi­ology. Like a number of other, earlier documents issued by various groups around the world, the re­port called attention to questions about how the technology will be used; whether it might be mis­used; what sorts of accidents might happen along the way; the economic, environmental, and social impacts of the eventual applications; whether the very idea of “synthetic biology” should be trou­bling; and how the debate over all of these ques­tions will be conducted. Also like most similar documents, however, while it called for careful monitoring and oversight of technology, it did not recommend any significant new constraints on its development and use. The commission's stance was that it would be “imprudent either to declare a moratorium on synthetic biology until all risks can be determined and mitigated, or to simply ‘let science rip,’ regardless of the likely risks.”In this report, we will take stock of the current consensus, comment on some of the major points of disagreement, and identify the next steps for the debate. In part I, we offer a brief overview of the research and applications commonly grouped together under the heading of synthetic biology, partly in order to set the stage for the rest of the discussion and partly because we want to highlight some conceptual problems that attend the very la­bel given this field. In parts II, III, and IV, we take up, respectively, three broad classes of concerns that arise in the context of synthetic biology: con­cerns about the intrinsic or inherent value of do­ing synthetic biology, concerns about the concrete harms and benefits of doing synthetic biology, and concerns about justice. Addressing these concerns requires a method for bringing the public's values to bear on policy‐making concerning emerging biotechnologies; in part V, we discuss the chal­lenges in developing such a method. (shrink)

Richard Dawkins’s best argument against the existence of God aims to show that the universe fits better with atheism than with theism. The fact that complex life developed gradually over a long period of time is required by an atheistic view but is not required by a theistic view. This fact, then, supports the atheistic view. This argument does raise the probability of atheism. I discuss four analogous arguments that point towards theism. I conclude that Dawkins’s argument lends some support (...) for atheism, but his strategy suggests sufficient arguments to see that the total case points in the opposite direction. (shrink)

The January‐February issue of the Report introduced a number of new features designed to provide opportunities for further give‐and‐take in our pages. In this issue, we put to use our revamped letters to the editor, Exchange, with a set of commentaries on another of the January‐February articles, Daniel Callahan's “Obesity: Chasing an Elusive Epidemic.” Commentaries in Other Voices and special reports are planned and solicited, in consultation with scholars in the field and with the guest editors of the special reports, (...) but our hope is that Exchange will provide an opportunity for unsolicited voices in the Report. Of course, Callahan's controversial article is all too good for drumming up unsolicited commentary: Callahan argued that the rise in obesity requires an aggressive public health campaign that employs some stigmatization of obesity. (shrink)

Two articles in this issue of the Hastings Center Report push the boundaries of bioethics, but in radically different directions. The lead article offers a new understanding of clinical translation—the process, that is, of generating clinical tools from the theoretical understanding of disease developed in the laboratory. The topic is important because, as Kimmelman and London point out, clinical translation is widely held to be in trouble. In general, the feeling is that there's been lots of basic science on disease (...) mechanisms over the last twenty years or so, but there's only a trickle of good new medications in the “drug pipeline.” Kimmelman and London's claim, crudely put, is that we’re looking at it wrong.In a second article, John Hardwig, author of one of the Report's more frequently mentioned articles, “Is There a Duty to Die?,” continues in somewhat that same surprising and maybe even contrarian vein by asking, in effect, whether there can ever be a duty to have an abortion. (shrink)